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This study assessed the effectiveness of tax enforcement tools as panacea for improving tax compliance 
and overall tax income in the Ondo State, Nigeria. Survey research design was adopted using primary data 
sourced through administration of structured questionnaire on 150 selected respondents from among staff 
of Federal Inland Revenue Service and State Board of Internal Revenue Service within the state. The Taro 
Yamane formula and judgment sampling technique were used to arrive at the sampled respondents. 
Outcome of Ordinary Least Square regression analysis showed regression coefficient and p-value of tax-
audit (0.278; p=0.03<0.05) and tax penalty (0.463; p=0.000<0.05) respectively, indicating a positive and 
significant relationship of the two explanatory variables with tax compliance at .05 level of significance. The 
Implication is that a marginal increase in tax audit and tax penalty will lead to increase in tax compliance in 
Ondo State. No meaningful association exists between tax amnesty and tax compliance based on the 
finding of this study perhaps tax amnesty is a new policy that was just launched to encourage voluntary tax 
compliance. As such, it is imperative that tax audit and imposition of tax penalties be encouraged and 
sustained. These are envisaged to further improve the degree of tax compliance, consequently enhancing 
government tax revenue generation to augment dwindling oil revenue in Nigeria. As regards relatively new 
and still under watch tax amnesty, it may turn out to be a veritable tool for voluntary compliance in future if 
properly nursed. 
 
Keywords: Tax Penalty, Tax Audit, Tax Amnesty, Tax Compliance, and Tax Enforcement 
 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of  
Interdisciplinary Studies 






Effective tax administration plays an important role in generating tax revenue for the government to 
enable it provides basic amenities that would improve standard of living of the citizenry.  Provision 
of good welfare, infrastructure and maintenance of high standard of living of citizens would be 
impossible without adequate revenue backing (Anyaduba, Eragbhe & Kennedy, 2012). Over the 
years, wide tax gap has been major constraints to tax revenue. Tax gap has been described as the 
difference between the total amounts of taxes pay voluntarily on time and actual taxes liabilities 
which is supposed to have been paid for the same period with little or no much effort (John, 
Emmanuel & Modugu, 2012). Certainly, the level of tax income generated by the government to 
meet her spending depends largely on the degree of compliance and the effectiveness of the 
enforcement tools (Alabede, Ariffin & Idris, 2011).  
Extant literature, most especially in the emerging economies have confirmed that most tax 
payers do not comply with tax provisions because of lack of trust and even sometimes inability to 
meet certain obligations (Oyedokun, 2015). Furthermore, some studies affirmed that majority of 
those that complied partially did so perhaps because of likely penalty that could arise if liability 
arises after tax audit (Nyaga, 2014; Oyedokun, 2015). Besides, some comply because of fear of 
possibility of being audited by tax auditors (Anyaduba & Mogudu, 2013; Ladi & Henry, 2015). 
According to Kirchler (2007), noncompliance may take any of the following; not filing of tax return 
all, understatement of income, overstatement allowable expenses, all with the intension of reducing 
tax liabilities.  
 Oyelade (2016), perceived low tax compliance in Nigeria as unpleasant; this is rampart 
because of ineffective administration encouraged by overreliance on crude oil revenue which 
resulted to neglect of taxation. Statistical evidences in Nigeria affirmed that, barely ten million 
taxpayers (precisely 10,006,304) registered under personal income tax in all the States of the 
Federation, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) inclusive. Surprisingly, about 4.6 million out of these 
taxpayers are covered by the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service (LIRS) alone. Average of 1.5% 
of the rest is under the coffer of each of the 35 States of the Federation including the FCT.  
Taking a look at the labour workforce of 77 million at the end of 2015 according to the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2015), with the working force of about 77 million, just about ten million 
(representing 13%) are within the tax net. The situation is not too different in the case of corporate 
income tax payers. With the then finance minister to have quoted that “the rate of compliance is 
about 12%” (Olokooba, Awodun, Akintoye & Adebowale, 2018). Until recent increase in corporate 
tax registration orchestrated by the current administration, the immediate past finance minister 
confirmed that over seventy-five percent of registered companies were outside the tax net; 
worrisome enough that 65% of those in the tax net hardly file returns nor pay taxes at all. The 
implication of the above is that less than nine percent of companies operating in Nigeria comply 
with tax obligation.  
Olokooba, Awodun, Akintoye & Adebowale,  (2018) averred that continuous violation of tax 
laws and persistent rise in low tax compliance has necessitated government at all levels to revisit 
enforcement strategies for effective tax administration towards improving tax revenue. Abel (2017) 
affirmed that tax evasion has remained subject of discussion in the Nigerian tax system for a very 
long period of time possibly because it is one of the major problems confronting effective tax 
administration in Nigeria. To effectively tackle problems of poor tax administration, government that 
had recorded remarkable improvement like Lagos State and few other had since employed some 
tools including tax audit, use of tax penalty and partially adopted tax amnesty when it was 
introduced.  Tax audit involves examination of taxpayers’ books of account to ascertain if actual tax 
returns reflect correct tax payment. Similarly, a tax penalty is a form of deterrence for not complying 
with tax obligation. For tax amnesty, it is a process that allows voluntary declaration of taxable 
assets and payment of such outstanding tax liabilities without payment of penalties.   
Wang and Hsieh (2015) ascertained that both developed and developing countries have 
adopted tax amnesty programs. Back since 1980, virtually all the State in the United States has 
conducted tax amnesty programs. Similarly, Spanish Government announced tax amnesty in 2012 
for assets not yet declared and those kept in tax havens.  Repatriation of these assets was allowed 
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subject to payment of 10 percent tax. This was done to prevent outflow of money from the State.  
Similarly, Nigeria government in 2017 introduced VAIDS (Voluntary Assets and Income Declaration 
Scheme) with the objective of benevolent tax amnesty for a limited time to defaulters. The scheme 
intends to instill fuller tax compliance, payment of outstanding tax liabilities as well as preventing tax 
evasion (Sam, 2017).  
It should be noted that if the amnesties are applied in line with the tax audits and fines, the tax 
evasion reverse effects can be minimized. Various studies have been conducted to examine the 
effects of the increased tax audits and penalties on the success of the amnesties. For instance Alm, 
Mckee and Beck (1990) pointed out that the tax revenues increase except that tax audits and 
penalties are ineffective. Muhrtala and Ogundeji (2013) were of the view that tax amnesty can 
improve tax compliance on the ground that strict measures are adopted such as constant tax audits 
with prosecutions. Similarly, higher audit probability will result in higher level of tax compliance 
provided that higher tax penalty rate is attached, which is capable of deterring noncompliance. This 
in turn will increase the amount of participants in tax amnesty program and continuous involvement 
(Puri, Bambang & Lukytawati, 2018).  
According to Ibrahim (2016), and Onuoha and Dada (2016), various enforcement measures 
are available when voluntary compliance seems difficult. These include tax audit, tax penalty and 
even tax amnesty and sometime tax holidays (Anah & Nwaiwu, 2018). There are other tax 
enforcement tools such as tax audits, placement of tax penalties and fines, detainment of assets 
and subsequent disposal of tax default property, and compulsory use of tax clearance certificate for 
major transactions (Samuel, 2015). Thus, extant literature have suggested that nexus subsists 
between the aforementioned tax enforcement tools and tax compliance.  
Moreover, the challenge evinced in tax compliance and collections have been worrisome. Out 
of the myriad of challenges bedeviling tax collection in Ondo State are unclear tax regulations, 
ineffective tax administration and inadequate public enlightenment about tax matters. Whereas, 
studies certain have established inverse relationship between administration (tax enforcement 
tools) and tax compliance most especially among the States that hardly survive with meager 
Federal allocations they receive due to dwindling oil revenue. Further, despite all efforts by previous 
administrations to improve tax revenue, tax proceeds have remained abysmally low and continue to 
shrink over the years. 
As such, this study was embarked upon with the central objective to access the degree at 
which effectiveness of tax audit, tax penalty and tax amnesty in the case of Ondo State, Nigeria 
influence tax compliance as a precursor for improving tax revenue.  
 
2. Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Review 
 
2.1 Tax Enforcement 
 
Enforcement in administration of taxes plays very crucial role in enhancing tax compliance. 
Enforcement task involves the use of myriad of tools in ensuring tax compliance. The essence of 
enforcement is to ensure strict adherence to various tax compliance ranging from timely filing, 
accurate filing, to payment of tax liability as at when due. Primarily, enforcement is not for tax 
defaulters alone who fail in their tax responsibilities but to consistent filers to encourage continuous 
compliance (Ibrahim, 2016).  
Tax compliance mechanisms may take various forms depending on tax authorities. In modern 
day, more than often, compliance tools may include levies, search and seizures of defaulting tax 
payers, fines, seeking and obtaining information from third parties like banks and court actions. Tax 
enforcement ordinarily refers to an act of ensuring that tax payer comply with tax law or rule. 
Enforcement with tax administration takes two forms namely; enforcement of tax laws and 
enforcement of judgment. There is enforcement of tax which is the application of all those relevant 
laws that will assist the tax authorities in carrying out their duties, not laws necessarily relating to 
the taxation but are relevant to the enforcement of tax laws. Enforcement of judgment on the other 
hand represents already decided court case against defaulted tax payment (Macharia, 2014). In 
Nigeria tax system, tax administration may not be efficient without tax enforcement because of the 
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sharp practices among larger percentage of taxpayer.   
Marziana, Mohamad, Norkhazimah and Mohmad (2010) affirmed tax compliance is the level 
at which a taxpayer complies or default the tax rules of their country.  One of the primary objectives 
of an effective tax administration in any country is to attain the degree of tax compliance best 
capable of reducing tax gap while maximizing tax revenue to the topmost. Roth, Scholtz and Witte 
(1989) reiterated that compliance with reporting requirement signifies that the taxpayer files all 
required tax returns timely and that the returns correctly report tax liability in line with the Internal 
Revenue code, tax laws and possibly court decisions if any, applicable at the time the return is filed. 
This demarcates clearly the line between tax compliance and noncompliance. 
A taxpayer may unintentionally fail to adhere to tax rules while filling his tax form/returns, or 
better still deliberately decided to pervade tax rule to suppress his tax liabilities even right  from the 
onset. The outcomes are the same whether an honest or dishonest mistake are made. 
Underreporting or over reporting may result. Theory submitted that tax evasion is the deliberate act 
of noncompliance with the tax law with the aim of reducing tax liability. Better still, failure to comply 
with tax reporting requirements could be as a result of mistakes, negligence, misinformation, or 
misunderstanding, or all.  
 
2.2 Tax Audit and Tax Compliance 
 
One of the determinants of tax compliance that determines the level of tax compliance which 
attracts prominence in tax compliance literature is tax audit. The degree of tax audit relies on two 
factors: the number of taxpayers flagged for audit and, its intensity and thoroughness of the audit. 
The first element is measured as the number of taxpayer audit conducted divided by the overall 
number of taxpayers. Tax audit is employed to determine the degree of tax audit for practical 
comparison and analysis (Adeniran, Alade & Oshode, 2013; Ladi & Henry, 2015). Administration 
cost is required during tax audit. An increase in the level of tax audit is advocated to reduce the 
amount of other administrative activities, such as taxpayer service, collection of taxes (Ibrahim, 
2016). 
Mahfar (1994) and Oyedokun (2015) averred that tax audit becomes expedient, going by the 
rising degree of non-compliance prevalent among developing countries of the world. Tax audit is 
required to compel defaulting corporate bodies, individuals and even charities organizations to drag 
them back to full compliance.  Non-compliance is feasible in failure to remit tax deduction, not filing 
tax returns, under-reporting of income, over-statement of deductions, or failure to pay the correct 
tax liabilities (Oyedokun, 2015; Ojonta, 2011; Mahfar, 1994). Tax audit is therefore an established 
tool to ventilate tax compliance.  
According to Okonkwo (2014), as cited by Onuoha and Dada (2016) refers to tax audit as an 
independent examination of book of accounts, tax returns, tax payments and other records of a 
taxpayer to confirm compliance with statutory tax requirement, rules and regulations and accuracy 
and correctness of tax paid and adhering to the relevant generally accepted accounting principles 
and standards. Anah & Nwaiwu (2018), sees tax audit as an examination of an individual or entity’s 
tax report by the relevant tax authorities in order to find out compliance with applicable tax laws and 
regulations of the state. However, the rate of recurrence of tax audits and investigations, in recent 
times, by the Federal Inland Revenue  
Service (FIRS) and the various State Boards of Internal Revenue (SBIR) have been on the 
increase (Ibrahim, 2016). 
 
2.3 Tax Penalties/Fines and Tax compliance  
 
The degree of penalty system may be different from one country to another: The rate of penalty is 
usually applied by the various tax authorities to determine penalty payable by defaulting tax payers 
(Ladi & Henry, 2015). Also, the types of evasion depend on penalty rate to be applied. For example, 
late filling of returns, normal filing with shortened‐reporting, refusal to keep records of source 
documents like invoices and receipts attract different penalty rate behaviour (Chirkos, 2015). With 
intentional evasion, the rate of penalty is greater than those of non-deliberate evasions (Hyun, 
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2005). This system might play an important role in increasing the level of penalty rates for the 
behaviour of tax evasion.  
There has not been correlation between statistics and theoretical findings as regards the 
effect of fines on tax compliance. Hyun (2005), confirmed that relationship between fines and tax 
compliance also shows inconsistent findings. The study of Park and Hyun (2005) indicated that tax 
compliance reacts better to fines than it does to audit possibility. Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg 
(1978), posited that holding constant the anticipated tax but altering audit probabilities with fines for 
non‐compliance, compliance moves up appropriately with risen fines, but not with higher audit 
probabilities. Other result of similar studies post different pictures. Brautigam, Old-Heldge and 
Mick’s (2008) result showed that fines and tax compliance are not related, but audit probabilities 
and tax compliance are. In an antagonistic climate, fines can be a part of the game of “cops and 
robbers”. In a synergistic climate, they can be perceived as an adequate retribution for behaviour 
that harms the community. Fines react to trust and power.  
 
2.4 Tax Amnesty and Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
Osman & Eren (2011) stressed that tax amnesty is the act of reducing or eliminating completely a 
definite or an indefinite punishment by authoritative governmental bodies through the tax 
authorities. Amnesty ordinarily means “to renounce a right”.  It represents the “legal deals” which 
removes the right to place a penalty; and prevent; either partially; and or completely, the execution 
of a penalty for the criminal acts. Tax amnesty removes the penalties or punishments to be 
executed against tax defaulters (Ojochogwu, 2012).  Wang & Hsieh (2015) affirmed that tax 
amnesties have been adopted repeatedly by many developed as well as developed countries such 
as the US, Italy and Argentina and had yielded desired results. According to Osman and Eren 
(2011), tax amnesty program varies from one country to another as well as covering some specific 
taxes. Tax amnesty has been found to be controversial tax compliance tool because while large 
revenue was generated in some countries; it failed woefully in others countries (Torger, 2003). 
In the case of Nigeria, government on 1 July 2017, introduced tax amnesty called “VAIDS” for 
defaulting taxpayers to use the said window to normalize their tax status. The Scheme which was to 
ensure full compliance within a reasonable period of nine-month window; and ceased on 30 March 
2018, was later extended to 30 June 2018. Defaulting taxpayers during period were expected to 
declare their assets and income from source within and outside country for the past six years 
covering 2011 - 2016 years of assessment (YOA). This was also meant to regularize their tax 
status and ensured total compliance.  
 
3. Theoretical Review 
 
3.1 Economic Utility/Deterrence Theory 
 
The contemporary revival of the economic analysis of crime began in 1968 with Becker’s’ classic 
article on crime and punishment. While Becker mentioned tax evasion as an area of application for 
his general model, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), provided the analysis. Generally, this approach 
treats noncompliance as a rational individual decision based upon probabilities of detection, 
conviction and levels of punishment. Deterrence theory is concerned with the effects of sanctions 
and sanction threats on criminal or undesirable behaviour. Deterrence theory was used as a basis 
to examine many types of criminal behaviour including tax evasion (Mohammed, 2015). 
 
3.2 Neoclassical Theory 
 
Before, neoclassical theorists had discussed tax amnesty in length economist, neoclassical 
economists have examined the impact of tax amnesties from various perspectives. Alm and Beck 
(1993) equally demonstrated that amnesties may influence compliance and tax collections, most 
especially if it is the social norm of the tax payers to pay taxes and the amnesty is subsequently 
followed by effective enforcement drives.  Amnesty may truncate tax revenues in the long-run 
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because of the likely reduction in tax compliance. Ability of tax amnesties to generate tax revenues 
in the long run is ambiguous, vague and unclear hence, tax amnesties are short-term revenues 
oriented.  The study of Andreoni (1991) examined tax amnesties and tax compliance and found that 
evasion increases during the amnesty periods but tax revenue does not necessarily fall. Reasons, 
tax evasion graduates to the extent to which people expect and are willing to participate in the tax 
amnesty and they will be to be recaptured new evader not the existing one who do not participate at 
all in the amnesty.  From the above, the substance of the two theories; deterrence and neoclassical 





Survey method of research design was employed to achieve the objectives of the study. The target 
population consists of 243 staff of Federal Inland Revenue Service and State Internal Revenue 
Service in Ondo State. Taro Yamen’s formula was adopted to arrive at the sample because of the 
population is heterogeneous in nature, this assist us to obtain meaningful sample size. We 
deliberately used judgmental sampling techniques to select the sample of 150 respondents from 
among senior and junior staff of Federal Inland Revenue Service and State Internal Revenue 
Service; these are those working directly in tax assessment and collection units and we ensure 
close monitoring to ensure all copies of questionnaire were retrieved. This was possible because of 
compact nature of the population of study. 
𝑛 = ேଵାே(௘)మ  
Where N= Population size 
n= sample size 
e= Level of significance (0.05) 
𝑛 = ଶସଷଵାଶସଷ(.଴ହ)మ  
= ଶସଷଵ.଺଴଻ହ  
= 150.4  
= 150  
The ordinary least square regression technique was employed to test the hypothesis of the 
study. The face validity and content validity of the questionnaire were verified to ensure that the 
questionnaire contains questions that measure the construct as well as covering covers all crucial 
aspect of the construct (Cooper & Schindler, 2008). Also, we established reliability of the instrument 
through a test and retest method, copies of questionnaire were administered, two weeks after 
collection, the same instrument were administered to the respondent thereafter, this test was used 
to determine the consistency and reliability respondents’ responses. Spearman reliability coefficient 
was also adopted to ascertain the reliability of the instrument. Therefore, the following propositions 
were investigated: 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant relationship between tax audit and tax compliance in 
Ondo State. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between tax penalty and tax compliance in 
Ondo State.  
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant relationship between tax amnesty and compliance in 
Ondo State. 
 
4.1 Model Specification 
 
In order to ascertain impact of tax enforcement tools on tax compliance in Ondo State a regression 
model was adopted since the variables of study are economic variable that are somehow 
dependent on one another. Therefore the general framework is as specified below: 
TAXCOMP =  β1TAXAUDIT +  β2TAXPEN + β3TAXNESTY +  Ԑ  
Where;  
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TAXCOMP - Tax compliance  
TAXAUDIT – Possibility of audit  
TAXPEN – Tax penalty 
TAXNESTY– Tax amnesty 
Ԑ-Error term 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents results of the analysis performed based on data collected. To start with, Table 
1 depicts results of reliability test using Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
5.1 Reliability Test 
 
Cronbach’s alpha (α) reliability testing tool was applied to examine the consistency and reliability of 
the research instrument. Table 1 shows the estimate of the Cronbach alpha to test for the reliability 
of the five-point Likert scale employed in this study so as to prevent spurious and invalid analysis. 
The findings recorded a fairly high Cronbach value of 0.756 which depict a consistent result.  
 
Table 1: Reliability Statistics 
 
Cronbach's Alpha Number of Items 
0.756 20 
 
Source: Authors computation  
 
Table 2 presents frequency and percentage of responses on tax audit and tax compliance. Results 
of the six-item questionnaire in this regard showed that tax audit has proclivity to drive tax 
compliance based on the submission of the tax officials. This is demonstrated by the position of the 
officials who majorly agree and strongly agree in each case that exposure to tax audit compels 
accurate reporting, improved tax payers’ cooperation, adequate tax returns, expose tax 
irregularities,  and the existence of standardized program that support tax audit, thereby informing 
improved tax compliance. 
 































There is possibility of been exposed by tax audit 
and this compels accurate reporting 90(60%) 45(30%) 6(4%) 5(3%) 4(3%) 
Tax audit exercise witness corporation of tax 
payer 32(21%) 71(47%) 17(11%) 9(6%) 21(14%) 
Tax payers file adequate tax returns because of 
fear of tax audit 61(40%) 39(26%) 30(20%) 10(7%) 10(7%) 
Regular tax audit influence tax compliance 38(25%) 62(41%) 23(15%) 13(8.7%) 14(9%) 
Tax irregularities would be uncovered during tax 
audit 42(28%) 59(39%) 31(21%) 12(8%) 6(4%) 
Tax authorities have standardized program that 
aid successful tax audit 47(31%) 59(40%) 20(13%) 8(5%) 16(11%) 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2018. 
 
Concerning possible association between tax penalties and level of tax compliance among tax 
payers in the State, seven-item based questionnaire was used. The descriptive results as shown in 
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Table 3 unveiled that Fear of being penalized, especially when caught, which can also lead to 
sealing up of the tax payers’ properties were confirmed by the larger proportion of the respondents 
as restraints informing increase in tax compliance. But most of the respondents are of the opinion 
that the present tax penalties are not deterrent enough to instill tax compliance among the tax 
payers while a considerable number of the tax payers are not familiar with tax penalties. This 
suggests need for further tax penalties education to the tax payers by tax authorities to enhance the 
level of tax compliance. 
 































Fear of being penalized will propel tax payer to 
file accurate and timely return 101(67%) 33(22%) 7(5%) 5(3%) 4(3%) 
Present tax penalties are not deterrent enough 
to instill tax compliance 23(15%) 58(39%) 36(24%) 11(7%) 22(15%) 
Tax offenders will choose to pay tax penalty 
rather than payment of actual tax liabilities 14(9%) 36(24%) 43(29%) 47(31%) 10(7%) 
Good numbers of tax payers are not familiar 
with tax penalties otherwise they would have 
complied 
46 (31%) 47(31%) 30(20%) 11(7%) 16(11%) 
Tax payers know they may not escape payment 
of penalty once detected hence, the need to 
comply 
71(47%) 36(24%) 30(20%) 4(3%) 9(6%) 
Sealing up tax payer properties as a form of 
penalty increases tax compliance 46(31%) 57(38%) 25(17%) 15(10%) 7(5%) 
Tax penalties will bring lasting solution to 
noncompliance problem. 55(37%) 32(21%) 25(17%) 11(7%) 27(18%) 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2018. 
 
As regards 7-item measure used to investigate ability of tax amnesty to ensure tax compliance as 
presented in Table 4, generally over 50% of the respondents submitted that tax pardon, exclusion 
from prosecution for tax offences, and waiver of penalties and interest charges possess latency to 
improve level of tax compliance. Above average of the tax officials also believe that tax amnesty 
has potential to reduce tax defaulters, propels declaration of all assets and income against 
inappropriate tax assessment leading to expansion of tax net capable of improving the rate of tax 
compliance, consequently ameliorating tax evasion. This descriptive result is a pointer that tax 
amnesty has propensity to inculcate willingness to comply with tax requirements by the tax payers.     
 































Tax pardon encourages tax payer’s voluntary 
declaration of all their income and assets 81(53%) 40(27%) 12(8%) 10(7%) 7(5%) 
Exclusion from prosecution for tax offence 
causes tax payer to pay their outstanding tax 
liabilities 
33(22%) 57(38%) 33(22%) 17(11%) 10(7%) 
Waiver of penalties and interest charges 
encourage tax payer to comply with tax 
obligation 
49(33%) 40(27%) 27(18%) 17(11%) 17(11%) 
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Many tax defaulters employed recently 
concluded tax amnesty to reconcile their tax 
default with tax authorities 
37(25%) 64(43%) 28(19%) 10(6%) 11(7%) 
Declaration of all assets and income will further 
prevent tax defaulter from inaccurate tax 
assessment 
46(31%) 48(32%) 38(25%) 13(9%) 5(3%) 
Expansion of tax net with the aid of tax 
amnesty will improve compliance and increase 
tax revenue 
35(23%) 62(41%) 28(19%) 11(7%) 14(10%) 
After tax amnesty, the perception of being 
already in tax net deters tax evasion 59(39%) 51(34%) 14(9%) 6(4%) 20(133%) 
 
Source: Field Survey, 2018. 
 
Table 5: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression estimates 
 
Dependent variable 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑀  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑈𝐷  0.278**(0.030) 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑃𝐸𝑁  0.463*** (0.000) 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐴𝑀𝑁  0.003 (0.977) 
𝐶  4.734*** (0.000) 
𝑅ଶ  0.543 
Adjusted 𝑅ଶ 0.529 
 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
 
The regression results comprise the OLS estimates, important statistics like R2 and adjusted R2.  
The coefficient of determination (R squared) of 54% revealed the variation in tax compliance as a 
result of the three independent variables (tax audit, tax penalty and tax amnesty) leaving other 46% 
of the variables outside the study. The results recorded existence of positive relationship between 
tax audit and tax compliance in line with the finding by Modugu and Anyaduba (2014). Invariably, 
tax audit impacts positively on tax compliance significantly at 5% level.  In addition, the significant 
coefficient is 0.278 which implies that a 1% increase in tax audit will cause tax compliance to rise by 
0.278% consistently Nyaga (2014) from Kenya but at a reduced proportion. Therefore, the more the 
tax audit, the likelihood of more compliance to tax regulations; this was supported by p-value of 
0.03<0.05 level of significance.  
In the same vein, findings also reported a positive relationship between tax penalties and tax 
compliance with a regression coefficient of 0.463 which confirmed the position of Park and Hyun 
(2005), and Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg (1978) that penalty is more related to tax compliance 
than tax audit contrary to Devos (2004). Also, the p-value of 0.000<0.005 confirms the significance 
of tax penalty.  The implication here is that an increase of 1% in tax penalties results in 0.463% rise 
in tax compliance. Instituting sustainable tax penalties regime best capable of deterring tax evasion 
will compel compliance as well as increasing tax revenue. In the case of tax amnesty, a positive 
(invariantly with Saidimu’s (2009) study from Kenya) but weak relationship between tax amnesty 
and tax compliance exists. This was evinced in regression coefficient of 0.003 and p-value of 
0.977>0.05 (statistically insignificant). As such, the results show that tax amnesty may form an 
effective tool for enhancing tax compliance now but possibly in the future. 
 
Table 6: ANOVAa 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F-Stat Sig. 
1 
Regression 855.542 3 285.181 25.381 .000b 
Residual 1640.458 146 11.236   
Total 2496.000 149    
a. Dependent Variable: Tax Compliance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Tax Penalty, Tax Amnesty, Tax Audit. Source: Authors computation f 
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ANOVA analysis was carried out to check the validity and significance of the model. Table 6 depicts 
the ANOVA results to test the significance of the overall model. With an F-statistics of 25.381, the 
results show that the model is significant at 1% level of significance since the p-value is 0.000. 
 
5.2 Hypotheses Testing 
 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1: There is no significant relationship between tax audit and tax compliance in 
Ondo State. 
 
With regression result; regression coefficient of 0.278 and p-value of 0.03<0.05, it is confirmed that 
significant and positive relationship exists between tax audit and tax compliance at 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between tax audit and tax compliance, thereby confirming applicability of deterrence theory. Thus 
we accept the alternative hypothesis. This finding is in tandem with that of Nyaga (2014) from 
Kenya, and Modugu and Anyaduba (2014) from Nigeria. 
 
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between tax penalty and tax compliance in 
Ondo State.  
 
Also, with p= 0.000<0.05 and regression coefficient of 0.463, a significant and positive relationship 
has been observed. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between tax penalty and tax compliance. Thus we accept the alternative hypothesis. This 
submission is in consonance with that of Anyaduba and Modugu (2013) but at variance with 
Soyinka, Jinadu and Sunday (2016) that employed similar survey research design to gather data 
used. It is established further that tax penalty serves as deterrent to enhance tax compliance in line 
with deterrence theory.  
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3: There is no significant relationship between tax amnesty and compliance in 
Ondo State. 
 
Here, p=0.977>0.05 and regression coefficient of 0.003 symbolized very weak or even lack of 
relationship at all between tax amnesty and tax compliance in Ondo State at 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant 
relationship between tax amnesty and tax compliance, providing further support to the finding by 
Andreoni (1991) but contrary to the submission by Benk (2016). This submission is at variance with 
the theoretical guess by Alm and Beck (1993) that amnesty may influence tax compliance. Thus, 
we accept the null hypothesis. However, this unique finding may not be dissociated from the fact 
that the scheme was relatively new the Nigerian tax system. 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
This study examined three major tax enforcement tools being employed to enhance tax compliance 
in Ondo State, Nigeria. Though there are other tools but the three instruments, namely; tax audit, 
tax penalties and tax amnesty were examined. It was found that these variables to certain extent 
influence tax compliance in Ondo state at different degrees for now with the exception of tax 
amnesty that has just been launched through VAID, which negates neoclassic economists’ position 
that amnesty may influence compliance.  Other two variables (tax audit and tax penalties) were 
found to be statistically significant and could induce tax compliance varying levels in accordance 
with deterrence theory. Whereas there is statistical but not significant relationship between tax 
amnesty and tax compliance. 
Therefore, this study concludes that low tax compliance is a matter of serious concern in 
Nigeria most especially in Ondo State because it decimates tax revenue of government and 
reducing its financial capability to meet developmental purposes. The gap created by low tax 
compliance is enormous. Since the tax revenue derivable by government to meet social and 
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developmental need of citizenry depends largely on the degree of tax compliance by tax payer most 
importantly now that oil revenue has declined, then government should adopt every workable 
strategy to ensure voluntary compliance or otherwise its time it uses the big arms of the law 
inherent in penalty to compel compliance. Fear of tax audit and possibility of resultant penalties 
have recorded successful compliance in Lagos state, Nigeria for instance, hence will yield similar 
results in Ondo State and possibly in other States of the Federation. 
It is recommended that regular tax audit should be entrenched most especially on major tax 
payers and high net worth citizens that mostly indulge in tax evasion. Constant tax audit will assist 
to detect fraudulent, incorrect and or underreporting of taxable incomes. Although it would not be 
feasible to conduct tax audit on all tax payers, the fear of a regular tax audit instills the fear of tax 
defaulters being apprehended one day. Similarly, tax penalty should be stiff enough to serve as 
deterrent to would-be tax defaulters; also, ability to pay principle should be encouraged. Tax 
amnesty should not be jettisoned for now as it may create a laudable avenue for enlarged tax net in 
the future. Tax education is recommended to further enlighten people about the need to fulfill tax 
obligations even right from the schools. Staff training especially in the area new technology is very 
important. In all, tax officers’ welfare should be reviewed upward to motivate them for transparency. 
Government should demonstrate sincerity in the use of tax income as this would further boost the 
tax payers’ trust in governance; these and many more would engender willingness to comply with 
tax obligation in Nigeria. Future study is encouraged investigate tax payers’ position in this regard, 
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